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Liability of Foreignness in Capital Markets: 
Institutional Distance and the Cost of Debt 
 
Abstract 
We extend the domain of liability of foreignness (LOF) research to capital markets and evaluate 
whether firms incur LOF when attempting to raise debt capital abroad. We rely upon multiple 
conceptualizations of institutional distance to capture the extent to which distance may contribute 
to LOF in capital markets.  Based on a sample of 361 firms from 45 countries over a 24 year 
time period, we find that institutional distances lead to increased cost of debt.  More importantly, 
we find that frequency of foreign bond issuance helps to mitigate the LOF.  We conclude with a 
discussion of our results and their implications for future research on understanding how firms 
address LOF when sourcing debt abroad. 
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Liability of Foreignness in Capital Markets: 
Institutional Distance and the Cost of Debt 
 
1. Introduction 
 Global capital market integration in the last two decades has had a profound impact on the 
strategies of firms accessing capital resources.  While considerable research has focused on the 
challenges that firms face when raising equity capital abroad, the largest component of the 
international capital market is the bond market (Lau and Yu, 2009).  In fact, between 1991-2005, 
35% of all capital raised through debt issues was raised in markets other than the firm's home 
market (Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, 2010, Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004).  Yet, little 
attention has been devoted to understanding problems firms face when attempting to issue bonds 
in foreign markets.  
There has been considerable research in the field of International Business (IB) on the 
additional costs that a firm faces while entering and operating in foreign markets. These 
additional costs that a local firm would not incur are referred to as liabilities of foreignness 
(LOF) (Zaheer, 1995).  LOF is considered as the “fundamental assumption driving theories of 
the multinational enterprise” (Zaheer, 1995: 341) and is often treated as a “taken-for-granted 
assumption” (Zaheer, 2002) in the international management literature.  To date, much of LOF 
research has focused on firms expanding their products, services, and operations to foreign 
countries to support their global expansion.  However, the increasing integration of capital 
markets adds a new dimension to internationalization (Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed, 2012). 
The implications of the globalization of capital markets for firm strategies have emerged as 
an important topic of theoretical and empirical inquiry in IB and finance literatures in recent 
years (Filatotchev, Bell, and Rasheed, 2016).  The choice of where and how to access capital 
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involves a multitude of considerations beyond simple cost comparisons.  For example, prior 
research shows that capital market choices have product market implications and vice versa 
(Frieder and Subrahmanyan, 2005;  Keloharju,  Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa, 2012).  Further, 
Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed (2012)’s examination of foreign IPOs demonstrate that 
capital market choice by firms is influenced by institutional considerations.  It is equally 
plausible that the role of institutional factors is not restricted to equity markets and extends to 
debt markets as well.  
Theoretically, both equity and debt involve agency costs associated with monitoring, 
enforcing, and constraining decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Research in finance has 
explored the existence of stockholder-bondholder conflicts (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005) 
which primarily manifest in terms of wealth appropriation and risk shifting.  Unlike 
stockholders, bondholders have no voting rights but can still exercise control through monitoring 
and restrictive covenants.  In countries like Japan and Germany, the monitoring function is 
predominantly carried out by debtholders (i.e., banks).  Clearly, the choice of capital structure 
has important governance implications.  Comparative corporate governance research suggests 
that governance practices are “embedded” within the wider context of formal and informal 
institutions, such as laws, regulations, and cognitive expectations of the governance participants 
(Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera, 2014; Cumming, Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb, and Senbet, 2017). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the institutional differences between the firm’s 
home country and host capital markets also have governance implications given that agency 
costs and governance properties of debt may vary across different capital markets. 
Our study integrates corporate finance research with IB studies and makes three important 
contributions. First, this paper extends the domain of LOF research to capital markets and 
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addresses the question whether firms incur LOF when attempting to raise debt capital abroad.  
We explore how bond investors in the host country may be affected by the “liability of foreign 
governance” associated with the firm’s home country. Second, we take an important step by 
investigating LOF in terms of its comparative, multi-country dimensions by investigating 
whether LOF is also a function of institutional distance between the firm’s home country and the 
host capital market.  Our key argument here is that, other things being equal, differences in 
macro-level, socio-economic environments in home and host countries affect the extent of the 
firm’s LOF even in the situations when fix-claim investors have fairly comprehensive 
understanding of the firm’s business model and the associated growth prospects. Third, we 
contribute to the understanding of economic significance of socio-economic distance by 
differentiating among the effects of various dimensions of institutional distance between the 
firm’s home and host markets in the context of international debt markets. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study in IB and finance areas that provides a comprehensive empirical exploration 
of the effects of different types of institutional distance on the costs of capital in global bond 
markets. We conclude with a discussion of our results and their implications for future research 
on understanding how firms address LOF when sourcing capital abroad. 
2. Theory and literature review 
2.1 Liability of foreignness  
Our analysis follows two fundamental assumptions based on prior research in IB.  First, firms 
doing business outside their home country may be at a disadvantage due to LOF.  Second, LOF 
may be a function of the distance between the firm’s home country and the host market.  
Therefore, in this section, we present an overview of the extant literature on LOF as well as the 
concept of distance in IB research.   
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Zaheer (1995: 343) defines LOF as “all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas 
incurs that a local firm would not incur.”  The focus of LOF is on the “social costs of access and 
acceptance” (Zaheer, 2002: 352).  These costs could either be structural/relational or 
institutional.  Structural/relational costs arise from a foreign firm’s network position in the host 
country and its linkages to important local actors.  Most likely, a local firm would incur less of 
these costs because it has better developed local networks.  Institutional costs arise from 
institutional differences between the home and host countries, and higher the institutional 
distance the lower the legitimacy of the foreign firm among local investors.   
The cumulative empirical evidence of prior research implies that, at least among firms 
competing in the product market domain, foreign-owned firms are expected to have lower 
profitability and a lower survival rate than local firms, ceteris paribus (see, e.g., Lord and Ranft, 
2000; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997).  The collective evidence also suggests that 
LOF is prevalent across a wide range of product and service-related industries such as banking, 
automobiles, and currency trading (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Mezias, 2002a, 2002b; Miller and 
Parkhe, 2002; Miller and Richards, 2002; Sofka and Zimmermann, 2008) and that LOF has a 
negative impact on firm performance (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Hasan and Hunter, 1996; 
Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Sofka and Zimmermann, 2005; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997). 
The strategies firms pursue in the product market domain are among the most important 
decisions that a firm will make.  However, firms often need external financial resources in order 
to capitalize on growth opportunities provided by their chosen product markets.  The increasing 
integration of global capital markets in recent decades has made it easier for firms to raise capital 
in foreign markets.  The main emphasis of prior research was on foreign equity markets. For 
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example, a successful listing abroad can enhance foreign operations or sales, enhance analyst 
coverage, and provide firms with larger amounts of capital in order to pursue growth and 
acquisition strategies (Karolyi, 2006).  Listing in a foreign market can also result in access to 
more liquid markets, financing at lower costs and better terms, and a wider investor base than 
they would have in their home capital market (Claessens, and Schmukler, 2007).  On the other 
hand, firms raising equity in a host country capital market may have to “underprice” their shares 
(Boulton, Smart, and Zutter, 2010).  It has also been found that they pay higher underwriting and 
professional fees, or higher initial listing fees than local firms.  For example, Bronson, Ghosh, 
and Hogan (2009) found that audit fees for firms cross-listed in the U.S. are 23% higher than 
those for U.S. firms.  Foreign firms experience difficulties in making themselves known to local 
investors (Bruner, Chaplinsky, and Ramchand, 2004).  In addition, foreign firms are subject to a 
greater frequency of lawsuits than local firms (Bhattacharya, Galpin, and Haslem, 2007).  Even 
more compelling evidence of LOF in capital markets comes from a study by Frésard and Salva 
(2010) who found that “the value of foreign firms with shares cross-listed on U.S. exchanges is 
around 14% lower than that of similar U.S. firms” (Frésard and Salva (2010: 2).   
There has been little research about the challenges faced by firms attempting to raise debt in 
foreign capital markets even though the largest component of the international capital market is 
the bond market (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004; Lau and Yu, 2009).  Recent research 
suggests that foreign firms are at a disadvantage compared to local firms in foreign debt markets.  
A growing body of research in finance demonstrates that foreign firms encounter “home bias” in 
capital markets (French and Porterba, 1991), a bias that is prevalent in both equity and debt 
markets.  That is, investors typically prefer to hold domestic securities rather than equity or debt 
instruments issued by firms outside of their home countries.  The prevalence of home bias in 
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debt markets is well documented (Fidora, Fratzscher, and Thimann 2006; Burger and Warnock 
2003, 2004; Lane, 2005; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Tesar and Werner, 1995).  With respect to 
LOF, research shows that cross-listed bonds have lower initial ratings, are less likely to be 
upgraded, and take longer to be upgraded compared to U.S. domestic bonds with similar issuer 
and issue characteristics (Atilgan, Ghosh, and Zhang, 2010).  Given the evidence in prior 
literature about the disadvantages faced by firms in foreign capital markets, it is important to 
systematically identify macro-institutional sources of these disadvantages. 
2.2 Institutional distance and liabilities of foreignness 
Foreign issuers of bonds are coming from home countries that represent a wide diversity of 
economic, cultural and legal institutions. Many of them would be very different to institutions 
operating in their target capital markets. How does institutional distance between the firm’s 
home and host countries affect LOF among firms competing in international debt markets?  
Hymer (1976) noted that liability of foreignness increases with the distance between the home 
and the host countries.  Bell et al., (2012) in their study of LOF in capital markets identified 
institutional distance and cultural distance as two potential sources of LOF.  Institutional distance 
is defined as the extent of differences in institutions between countries (Xu and Shenkar, 2002).  
Berry, Guillen and Zhou (2010) proposed a comprehensive set of nine dimensions along which 
cross-national distance can be based on three distinct conceptualizations of cross-national 
institutions.  They argue that countries differ in terms of national business systems (Whitley, 
1992), governance (Kester, 1996), and innovation systems (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993).   
We argue that institutional distance affects the LOF firms face when attempting to access 
international debt markets.  From the corporate governance perspective, when investors perceive 
that the risks and costs of acquiring and holding securities issued by foreign firms are higher than 
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they are for local securities, they are likely to prefer local securities and price-protect themselves 
against risks of holding foreign securities by putting a discount on their value (Bell, Filatotchev, 
and Aguilera, 2014).  Apart from being related to the firm’s economic fundamentals, such as 
leverage, performance, industry affiliation etc., these risks and costs are also associated with 
corporate governance environment within which the foreign firm operates.  The investors’ 
perceptions of the firm’s LOF affect both their expectations of the probability of default and how 
much can be recovered in case of default.  We contend that these perceptions are mostly 
attributed to institutional differences between home and host country capital markets. For 
example, these differences typically relate to factors such as protections afforded to minority 
investors and debtholders, taxation, and informal institutional settings in the home country, such 
as the level of corruption, and the importance of informal networks.  Investors would expect to 
be compensated for their higher risk through higher returns which in turn increases LOF for 
foreign issuers.  An important insight from prior studies is that there are different types of 
institutional distance and that the underlying socio-economic mechanism linking a particular 
distance with firm-level outcomes are theoretically different.  This clearly suggests the need to 
fully acknowledge the multidimensionality of institutional distance and therefore the theoretical 
imperative to investigate their effects separately.   
There has been a growing recognition that culture affects both economic exchange and 
outcomes by affecting expectations and preferences (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009; Fernandez and Fogli, 2007; Tabellini, 2007, 
2008; Zingales, 2015).  Culture affects the level of trust and nature of financial contracting, two 
core pillars of corporate governance.  For example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that 
investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of firms that are located close to the 
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investor.  More recently, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) found that trust is related to 
amount of trade, portfolio investment, and direct investment.  Zhu and Cai (2014) found that 
greater cultural differences between U.S. investors and foreign issuers increase the cost of debt.  
Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) found that more uncertainty avoiding societies are associated with 
lower levels of foreign equity investment and that societies with higher levels of individualism 
invest more in foreign equities.  Cultural differences are related to trading activity levels and 
security pricing (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010).    
In a similar vein, there is considerable variation across countries in terms of their ability to 
innovate and create new knowledge.  Knowledge distance refers to how large a gap exists 
between the source and the recipient in terms of their knowledge bases. Knowledge distance is 
closely related to cognitive distance (e.g., Berry, Guillen, and Zhou, 2010). There is increasing 
attention to research on national innovation systems (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993).  It is likely 
that investors will view firms from nations with better innovation systems as having greater 
growth potential both because of their ability to innovate and because of knowledge spillovers 
occurring in their economies.  Clearly, culture and knowledge distances do affect investor 
behavior and they might work against a firm that is accessing foreign capital markets.  Hence, we 
expect that both cultural and knowledge distances between the firm’s home and host countries 
should increase LOFs it faces in the global debt markets. 
Further, economic and financial macro-institutional factors have been used in IB finance 
research as key drivers of investment transactions and the associated corporate governance 
processes (Cumming et al., 2017; La Porta et al., 1998; Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997).  Economic 
distance is exhibited in differences in wealth/income between countries, along with differences 
in costs and quality of factors of production (Ghemawat, 2001). The smaller the economic 
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distance between the home and host countries, the more similar the countries are in terms of their 
income and wealth profiles, and thus the more alike they should be in their investment 
preferences, according to the country similarity theory in international economics (Linder, 1961). 
Economic similarity is reflected in commonality in the attitudes and lifestyles of consumers and 
investors (Hewitt, Roth, and Roth, 2003).  While economic distance focuses on differences in 
factors such as income levels and inflation rates, financial distance looks at differences in equity 
and credit markets. The more proximate or similar a country is in terms of economic and 
financial institutional factors, investors in the host market are likely to view it as less foreign.   
Therefore, we expect that economic and financial distances will have effects of the firm’s LOF in 
the global bond markets similar to cultural and knowledge distances. 
Finally, regulatory/administrative distance between home and host countries refers to 
differences in countries’ rules, laws and regulations, including governance and its enforcement 
mechanisms (Ghemawat 2001; Kaufmann et al., 2006).  When two countries share the same 
legal system, this makes them relatively close in administrative distance. However, overcoming 
administrative distance is also about learning to deal with the institutions and legal systems in the 
host country (Gooderham, Gooderham, and Grøogaard, 2013).  Significant dissimilarities may 
intensify difficulties of foreign firms raising debt resources in a host market because differing 
levels of rule of law may entail unfamiliar prescriptions as to what constitutes legitimate action 
in a foreign environment (Denk et al., 2012; Oxley and Yeung, 2001; White et al., 2013). Hence, 
investors are more likely to invest in the securities issued by a company that hails from a country 
that has a common administrative heritage and thus proximate in terms of administrative 
distance.  Again, regulatory/administrative proximity is expected to reduce the firm’s LOF in the 
foreign debt market.  
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Our previous arguments are related to a theoretical link between the firm’s LOF and risks 
and uncertainties associated with different types of institutional distance.  However, within the 
context of repeated game, governance problems can be mitigated by increasing mutual 
understanding and trust among players. Eden and Miller (2004) point out that social costs arise 
from unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards.  Unfamiliarity can be seen as a two-
sided phenomenon.  That is, a firm may lack knowledge of or experience in the host country.  
Similarly, investors in the host market may be unfamiliar with the firm trying to raise capital. As 
a firm repeatedly access a capital market, these unfamiliarity hazards are likely to diminish over 
time.  A similar logic applies to relational hazards as well.  With repeated efforts to access 
capital in a foreign market, the firm develops closer relationships with capital market participants 
such as investors, underwriters, law firms, and banks thereby reducing relational hazards.  
Discrimination hazards primarily arise from legitimacy deficit (Schmidt and Sofka, 2009).  
Continued presence in a host capital market and a history of meeting its financial obligations will 
result in an increase in legitimacy and reduce discrimination hazards as the firm increasingly 
gains insider status.  Thus, we expect the firm’s cost of capital when approaching a foreign debt 
market will be related, ceteris paribus, to a complex interplay between macro-institutional 
factors associated with its home and host countries and the extent of trust and familiarity 
associated with repeated bond issues in the same foreign market.  
3. Sample, research design, and variable measurement 
3.1 Sample 
We collected foreign debt issuance data from Securities Data Company’s (Thomson Reuters 
SDC) New Issues Database.  The sample period covers foreign debt issued between January 
1991 and December 2014.  The data covers the maturity, bond issue size, coupon rate, yield to 
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maturity, treasury yield, yield spread to the benchmark, and credit ratings of the issue, etc.  We 
omitted debt issues with less than one-year maturities.   
All the observations obtained from SDC as foreign or domestic bond are based on destination 
market’s nationality such as Yankee bonds (US), Bulldog bonds (UK), Samurai bonds (Japan), 
Kangaroo bonds (Australia), Rembrandt bonds (Netherlands), Matador bonds (Spain), Kauri 
bonds (New Zealand), Dragon bonds (China), Alpine bonds (Switzerland), Maple bonds 
(Canada), etc.  Altogether there are seventeen different categories of foreign debt listed in SDC 
database based upon destination markets.  To remove the tax impacts on the destination market 
choice, our sample does not include those foreign bonds issued in tax-haven countries such as 
Belize, Barbados, Cayman, Cyprus, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Virgin Island, Bermuda, 
Bahamas, Costa Rica, etc. 
We follow the sampling procedures of others (e.g., Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, 2010) in 
order to isolate the foreign debt offerings of corporations rather than those of banks1.  Moreover, 
our sample is restricted to only non-convertible foreign bonds.  In addition we have eliminated 
from consideration preferred stock, bonds-pipeline and registrations, medium-term note 
programs, private debt, as well as mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities.  
After eliminating firms with missing data and outliers, we were left with a sample of 361 unique 
firms from 45 economies covering the period 1991–2014, totaling 772 observations. 
We manually collected and calculated the distance measures from a variety of different 
sources.  For each data observation we calculated the six distance measures (cultural, knowledge, 
economic, financial, political, and demographic) between home and host countries as described 
                                                 
1 We eliminated debt issues by firms in the finance and utility industries, and from governments.  Financial firms usually have high 
leverage, which indicates distress for non-financial firms.  Energy firms are highly regulated by local governments, which could 
have impact on their financing decisions.  Our final sample covers different industries such as agriculture, construction, electric 
service, healthcare, insurance, leisure, manufacturing, real estate, restaurant/hotel, retail, sanitation, telecom, transportation, 
wholesale, etc. 
14 
 
in Table 1.  In addition, we used dummy variables to differentiate between legal systems.  
Finally, we matched our sample distance variables and bond data to analyze how each individual 
distance factor influences the cost of debt financing.   
3.2 Dependent variable 
 Yield Spread. From a bond issuer’s perspective, cost of debt is the rate at which firm can 
borrow currently, so it reflects not only the level of interest rates in the market but more 
importantly the risk premium.  We use this as our first proxy for the LOF as the higher the firm’s 
LOF the higher would be its cost of debt.  Theoretically, the cost of debt is computed by taking 
the rate on a risk-free bond matching the term structure of the corporate debt, then adding the 
risk premium.  Corporate bonds typically trade at higher yields than treasury bonds of 
comparable maturities, since corporate bonds have higher risk, higher probability of default and 
lower liquidity as compared to the treasury bonds.    
 Usually we can directly observe interest rates in the financial market.  If the firm already has 
bonds outstanding, the yield to maturity (YTM) on bonds is the market required rate of return on 
the firm’s debt.  The yield spread (YS), which is the difference between YTM and Treasury 
bond, is far more important since it can be used in determining the “relative” cost of debt.  It 
measures the “relative” price of corporate bonds as compared with Treasury bond of the same 
maturity and it captures the risk premium of interest.   
  Although it is a common practice in finance to define YS as the relative cost of debt, there is 
continued debate surrounding whether the YS is related to default risk, liquidity risk, maturity 
risk, call risk, country risk, or any other potential explanatory variables.  Duffee (1998) argues 
that the relation between non-callable Treasury yields and yield spreads of callable corporate 
bonds should depend on the callability of the corporate bonds. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find 
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that monthly credit spread changes are principally driven by local supply/ demand shocks which 
are independent of credit-risk and liquidity factors. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2007) find 
that illiquid bonds have higher yield spreads, and improvement in liquidity causes a significant 
reduction in yield spreads.  Huang and Huang (2012) find that credit risk explains a small 
fraction of investment-grade bonds’ yield spreads, while for a much higher fraction of 
speculative bonds’ yield spreads.  Our baseline model follows Chen et al. (2007) yield spread 
determinants such as liquidity, maturity, face value, coupon rate, treasury rate, bond rating, etc.   
 Interestingly, there is limited research investigating the yield spread of foreign bonds.  For 
example, Melnik and Nissim (2003) investigate the issue costs such as underwriter fee, 
underwriter spread and underpricing of international bonds.  Petrasek (2010) found that global 
bonds have a significant liquidity and price advantage over comparable domestic bonds.  Yet, 
research has yet to identify the factors that impact the costs of the foreign bonds.   
Our focus in this study is to evaluate how distance between the bond’s issuer’s home and 
host countries could play a role in the cost of debt.  Therefore, to examine the impact of distance 
on cost of debt for foreign bonds, we gather data from SDC and the Federal Reserve for 
historical yields on treasury securities.  We use this information to compute the yield spread of 
the newly issued debt relative to treasury securities of the same maturity.  We relied upon linear 
interpolation to estimate the comparable treasury yield in the few instances in which some bond 
issues could not be perfectly matched to a treasury security maturity at a given point in time.  
The yield spread is computed as the yield on the bond issue (obtained from the SDC Platinum 
Global New Issues database) minus the yield on treasury securities2.  Table 1 provides definition 
and data sources for each of our variable calculations.    
                                                 
2 It’s common practice in finance to take yield spread as dependent variable when determining the cost of debt.  For 
example, Chen et al. (2007) specified the model with the yield spread as dependent variable and the various yield 
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Underwriting costs.  Although the interest cost is the most important cost that firm incurs 
while accessing foreign capital markets, there are other one-time costs which are of significant 
magnitude.  Total compensation is typically divided into 20% management fee, 20% 
underwriting fee, and 60% selling concession (Torstila, 2001).  Management fee is the portion of 
compensation paid to the lead manager; underwriting fee is the portion of compensation paid to 
the lead and co-managers who were part of the purchasing group, and selling concession is the 
portion allocated to the selling group, which is equal to the discount at which securities are 
allocated to the selling group for resale to the investing public minus the offer price.  All these 
three components are expressed in dollars per bond. We aggregated these fees together to have a 
measure of the one-time cost that the firm incurs when issuing foreign debt.   
3.3 Independent variables 
The main independent variables of interest in our paper are related to distance which we 
theorize as an antecedent of liability of foreignness.  We measure distance by seven different 
institutional distance conceptualizations, namely, cultural, knowledge, economic, financial, legal, 
political and demographic distances.  Table 1 summarizes our distance calculations.   
Cultural Distance. National culture is defined as the “collective mental program” that 
normalizes individual activities in a society, with measurements in five dimensions: power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and long-term orientation (Hofstede, 
2001).  Due to the data limitation for long-term orientation, we use the first four dimensions to 
                                                 
spread determinants as independent variables.  We deleted any observations with a negative yield spread, as these are likely 
data entry errors.   
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capture cultural distance between the home country and host country, following Kogut and Singh 
(1988) and Salomon and Wu (2012).  There is no agreement in the literature as to what is the 
best way to measure the distance between two entities (Berry et al., 2010).  To analyze the 
various distance measures individually, we follow the most recent empirical research of Salomon 
and Wu (2012) by using standardized mean difference.  The standardized mean difference 
reflects how a foreign bond issuer’s home country differ from the foreign market on a specific 
measure. The cultural distance (CD) measure, which is time invariant and constant for each 
country, is calculated as sum of absolute differences between economic dimensions Cni in home 
country and Cny in host country divided by the standard deviation SD (Cn) on cultural dimension 
n across all participating countries, with n represents each dimension of cultural indicator, and i 
and y stand for the home and host countries respectively.  The formula is defined as follows.  
CDi-y = {∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝐶𝑛𝑖 − 𝐶𝑛𝑦)/𝑆𝐷(𝐶𝑛)
4
𝑛=1 }                                                  
We use absolute value (ABS) of the differences to represent the magnitude of distance, with a 
greater value indicating greater difference between home country’s culture and that of the host 
country. 
Knowledge Distance. We follow Berry et al. (2010) to measure knowledge distance (KD) as 
the absolute value of the difference in knowledge (as measured by the number of scientific 
articles per 1 million population) between the home and host countries of the foreign bond.  
Firms are likely to choose to finance firms from a country with similar average capacity of 
expertise, awareness, judgement, etc.  A greater value indicates greater differences between the 
home country’s knowledge level and that of the host country. Unlike in the case of cultural 
difference, this measure is a time dependent variable and thus changes every year, representing a 
foreign bond’s distance in any given year, given any specific issuer’s home and host countries.  
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The knowledge distance is computed using the following formula, where Kit represents the 
knowledge of home country i at time t and Kyt represents the knowledge of host country y at time 
t. 
KDi-y,t = |𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝐾𝑦𝑡| 
Economic Distance. The international business literature has well documented four 
dimensions of economic distances: country’s economic wellbeing as measured by GDP per 
capita, openness of the economy as measured by imports and exports as a proportion of GDP 
respectively, and inflation rates.  The economic distance (ED) is computed as the sum of 
absolute differences between economic dimensions Enit in home country and Enyt in host country 
is divided by the standard deviation SD (Ent) on economic dimensions n across all participating 
countries, with n represents each dimension of economic indicator, and i and y stand for the 
home and host countries respectively at time t.  The formula is defined as follows:  
EDi-y,t ={∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝐸𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑛𝑦𝑡)/𝑆𝐷(𝐸𝑛𝑡)
4
𝑛=1 } 
We use absolute value (ABS) of the differences to represent the magnitude of distance, and a 
greater value indicates greater difference between home country’s economic measures and that 
of the host country.   
Financial Distance. The 45 countries in our sample are of various levels of macroeconomic 
activities, and they also hold heterogeneous financial market structure.  Some countries are well 
developed and organized in the international capital markets while others are still in their 
emerging stages. Financial differences across countries have exposures related to the equity and 
credit markets.  Following Berry et al. (2010) we included three dimensions in our analysis: 
market capitalization of listed companies, the number of listed companies, and the amount of 
private credit available.  All these measures are calculated as a percentage of GDP.  A higher the 
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number of listed firms in the host country indicates a more active and more mature financial 
market, and therefore the country is more attractive to the international capital investors.  The 
financial distance (FD), time-varying throughout the sample period, is calculated as the sum of 
absolute differences between financial dimensions Fnit in home country and Fnyt in host country 
divided by the standard deviation SD (Fnt) on financial dimensions n across all participating 
countries, with n represents each dimension of financial indicator, and i and y stand for the home 
and host countries at time t respectively. The formula is defined as follows:     
FDi-y,t = {∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝐹𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝑛𝑦𝑡)/𝑆𝐷(𝐹𝑛𝑡)
4
𝑛=1 } 
We use absolute value (ABS) to represent the magnitude of distance, and a greater value 
indicates greater difference between home country’s financial measures and that of the host 
country. 
Legal distance is defined as differences in bureaucratic patterns due to colonial ties, 
language, religion, and the legal system (Berry et al, 2010; La Porta et al., 1998).  Here we use 
dummy variables to represent the different legal origin, including (1) common law; (2) French 
civil law; (3) German civil law; and (4) Scandinavian civil law, between the home and host 
countries of foreign bond.  Dummy Variable Common Law stands for foreign issued from a firm 
in a common-law country to a destination market in a civil-law country. Similarly, dummy 
variables Scandinavian or German or French stands for foreign bond issued by a firm from a 
civil-law country to a destination market of common law system.  Benchmark of the dummy 
variables in the sample means the issuing market and destination market have the same legal 
system.    We view a firm from a civil law country issuing debt in a common law country as a 
move “up” as common law countries have better investor protection and higher quality of law 
enforcement.  Similarly, a firm from a common law country issuing debt in a civil law country 
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can be viewed as a move “down.”   A move to a country with a similar legal system would be a 
“lateral” move.  When the issuing firm is from a common-law country with destination market in 
the civil law countries, the cost of debt increases with distance.                                  
Political distance is defined as differences in the following five factors including (1) political 
stability measured by considering independent institutional actors with veto power; (2) country’s 
democracy score; (3) size of the state Government consumption as percentage of GDP; (4) 
country’s membership in WTO; and (5) Regional trade agreement.  (Berry et al, 2010).  When 
firms enter politically distant countries, it becomes more difficult for them to conduct business 
(Gaur and Lu, 2007).  Hence, we would expect the cost of borrowing increases when firms issue 
bonds in politically distance countries.   The political distance (PD) is calculated as the sum of 
absolute differences between political dimensions Pnit in home country and Pnyt in host country 
divided by the standard deviation SD (Pnt) of political dimensions n across all participating 
countries, with n represents each dimension of political indicator, and i and y stand for the home 
and host countries at time t respectively. The formula is defined as follows:     
PDi-y,t = {∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑛𝑦𝑡)/𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑛𝑡)
5
𝑛=1 }                                                
We use absolute value (ABS) to represent the magnitude of political distance, A greater value 
indicates greater differences between the home country’s political environment and that of the 
host country.   
Demographic distance is defined as differences in the following four factors including (1) 
Life expectancy; (2) birth rate (3) population under 14 as percentage of total population and (4) 
population ages 65 and above as percentage of total population (Berry et al, 2010).  A greater 
value indicates greater differences between the home country’s demographic composition and 
that of the host country.  The demographic distance (DD) is calculated as the sum of absolute 
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differences between demographic dimensions Dnit in home country and Dnyt in host country 
divided by the standard deviation SD (Dnt) of demographic dimensions n across all participating 
countries, with n represents each dimension of demographic indicator, and i and y stand for the 
home and host countries at time t respectively. The formula is defined as follows:     
DDi-y,t = {∑ 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝐷𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑛𝑦𝑡)/𝑆𝐷(𝐷𝑛𝑡)
4
𝑛=1 } 
We use absolute value (ABS) to represent the magnitude of demographic distance.  A greater 
value indicates greater differences between the home country’s political environment and that of 
the host country.                                 
Frequency of Issuance. The final explanatory variable in our model is frequency of issuance.  
We operationalized this as a dummy variable.  The frequency dummy variable is assigned a 
value of one if it is by a “frequent” issuer (i.e. firm which issues foreign bond for more than once 
during the sample period) in the same foreign bond market, and a value of zero otherwise.   
3.4 Control variables 
Our model includes well accepted bond issue characteristics as control variables in keeping 
with prior literature.   Leland and Toft (1996) find longer Maturity leads to higher yield spread, 
holding all the other factors constant.  Specifically, they find that credit spreads at the optimal 
leverage are almost zero for issuance maturities of 2 years or less, while credit spread 
significantly increase to 110 basis points for debt with 20 years to maturity.  Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) find that yield to maturity is higher on debt notes, with longer maturity and 
liquidity, than treasury bills.  They also find that the yield differential between notes and bills is a 
decreasing and convex function of the time to maturity.  Therefore, we use the natural log of 
issue's maturity in months to capture the convex relationship between maturity and yield spread.  
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Bond Rating variable proxies for default risk.  Actually, bond rating alone explains 15.20% 
of the cross-sectional variation of yield spread (Chen et al. 2007).   While ratings are often useful 
tools to account for the cost of debt, a firm can have multiple ratings.  Here we use the specific 
foreign bond issue’s rating, instead of the firm’s long term debt rating, to precisely measure the 
foreign bond risk level.  As detailed in Appendix 1, letter ratings by S&P are mapped into a 
single numeric scale, with better credit quality indicated by lower numbers: AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, 
…… , C = 21.  S&P's numeric rating, the higher the number, the lower the rating.  If S&P's 
numeric value is higher (i.e., lower S&P's rating), then higher credit risk and higher yield spread.  
See Appendix 1 for a description of the chart which converts these alphabetical ratings into 
numerical ratings3. 
Coupon Rate measures the historical rate of return on the bonds, so usually a higher coupon 
rate leads to a higher required rate of return on bond, and thus a higher yield.  Buse (1970) 
illustrates sign and magnitude of coupon effects on the required rate of return on bonds.  Caks 
(1977) expands the model to derive the zero coupon bond’s interest rate from the non-zero 
coupon bond prices.  Treasury Yield also has an important impact on the yield spread.  If 
Treasury yield is lower, then market rate is lower and therefore higher callable risk and higher 
yield spread.  Finally, we also control for Issue Size.  Intuitively, bigger bond issue size should 
indicate higher default risk and thus higher yield spread.  Each of these measures is described in 
Table 1.     
4. Results 
                                                 
3 We followed common procedure by previous paper such as Morgan (2002) and Livingston et al. (2007) by 
mapping the letter credit ratings into a single numeric scale, with better letter ratings corresponding to lower 
numbers: AAA = Aaa = 1, AA+ = Aal =2,... Bl = B3 = 16. 
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As Table 2 shows, firms from across a wide number of countries and regions have chosen to 
raise debt externally.  However there are a few areas that show considerable activity, both overall 
and across each of the five year increments.  Most notably, firms in Canada, United Kingdom, 
United States, Asia, and Western Europe have historically had the highest number of foreign 
debt issues.  Among these Canada, United Kingdom and United States had the greatest number 
of foreign debt offers, followed by firms from Asia and Western Europe.  Due to the increasing 
popularity of global bonds and Eurobonds, across these markets as well as most others, the 
number of foreign debt offerings has slowed within the 2006-2010 timeframe.  Indeed, only 
firms from Western Europe, the United States, and Asia have maintained a steady volume of 
foreign debt offerings within this most recent time period. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 2 also illustrates the markets in which firms choose to raise foreign debt.  The US 
(Yankee bonds) is where most firms have historically chosen to make their foreign corporate 
debt offers.  However, beginning in the 2001-2005 time periods, other markets begin to show 
increasing volume.  In fact, between 2006 and 2010 firms domiciled in Western Europe have 
chosen other foreign markets, by issuing global bonds and Eurobonds, to raise debt resources and 
have bypassed US capital markets almost completely. Likewise, firms from almost all other 
regions have chosen to look to other external capital markets besides the US to raise debt 
resources.   
Second, our sample of foreign bond markets also identified interesting characteristics 
associated with bond maturity, coupon rate, bond ratings, yield spread, as well as other indicative 
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characteristics of bonds.  As can be seen in Table 3 Panel A, firms from United States issue 
foreign bonds with the shortest maturity.  However, firms from Canada tend to issue Yankee 
bonds and usually have long maturities.  Firms from the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
France tend to issue the largest foreign bond issues in terms of dollar amount issued.   
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 Panels A and B about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Table 3 Panels A and B contain descriptive statistics of the yield spreads and other variables 
relevant to our analysis by home and host countries.  For investment grade debt issues, the 
average yield spread is slightly lower.  Companies from Canada, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Mexico, Middle East, Western Europe, and others usually 
issue foreign bonds with lower credit ratings and higher yield spreads.  In Table 3 Panel B, there 
does not appear to be substantive differences in bond maturity across these different listing 
markets.  For instance, US, Australia, and Japan tend to receive the largest foreign bond issues in 
terms of dollar amount issued, while Spain receives the least.  A comparison of the destination 
markets shows that foreign firms tend to gravitate to the U.S. capital market and issue more 
Yankee bonds with both larger principal amounts and longer terms than other foreign bond 
destination markets. Most importantly, among destination markets for foreign bonds, Yankee 
bonds charge the highest yield spread.  
Table 4 provides summary statistics of distance measures.  Table 5 shows the correlations 
between pairs of dimensions of distance, each calculated with the greatest number of 
observations available. The coefficients signs are as expected.  Our results show that distance 
measures (cultural, knowledge, economic, financial, and demographic) are mostly positively 
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correlated with each other.  Although correlations are generally as expected, some coefficients 
among the distance variables are high, therefore, we will test the individual distance measures in 
regression to eliminate potential multicollinearity concerns.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here  
--------------------------------------- 
4.1 Empirical results 
Table 6 presents the multivariate regression results using yield spread as a proxy for LOF.  We 
run the following regression equation to test the impact of institutional distance measures, both 
separately and collectively, on the yield spread.  We control the year dummy in each regression 
given that the sample covers 24 years.  In addition, we control issuer fixed effects in each 
regression to prevent potential issuer influences since a small set of companies may dominate the 
foreign bond market.    
YIELD_SPREADiy,t = f {Maturityiy,t, Issue_Sizeiy,t, Coupon_Rateiy,t, Credit_Ratingiy,t, 
Freq_Issueiy,t,Treasury_Yieldiy,t, DISTANCEn,iy,t} 
Table 6 Column (1) consists of the base model without the distance independent variables.  
As expected, cost of debt of foreign bonds increases with larger maturity risk, larger issue size, 
higher historical rate, higher callable risk, and lower credit rating.  Our results demonstrate that 
cost of debt is sensitive to the frequency of foreign bond issuance.  Specifically, these results 
suggest that the cost of foreign bonds diminish for frequent foreign bond issues.     
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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Columns (2) – (8) in Table 6 include the distance variables to evaluate LOF in foreign debt 
markets.  Coefficient of cultural distance in Column (2) of Table 6 demonstrates a positive 
relationship between the cultural distance between a home and host country and the extent of 
LOF faced by a foreign firm.  For example, the result shows one percentage increase (decrease) 
in cultural distance and knowledge distance would lead to 0.061 percentage and 0.581 
percentage of increase (decrease) in the yield spread, respectively.  Economic distance and legal 
distance have larger and more significant impact on the yield spread, with one percentage 
increase (decrease) in economic distance and legal distance in common law resulting in 0.917 
percentage and 0.891 percentage of increase (decrease)  in the yield spread, respectively.  In 
addition, adding the distance measures into the baseline model also improves the R2 of 
regressions in general.     
In column (3), we find that Knowledge Distance is significantly positively related to the cost 
of foreign debt. The results suggests that the yield spread increases with the Knowledge 
Distance.  Therefore, cultural-cognitive and knowledge distances do affect the cost of financing 
in foreign capital markets.    
The coefficient of Economic Distance is significantly positive in column (4) of Table 6, 
suggesting a larger economic distance between home and host countries contribute to the 
increase of the cost of debt.  This result seems intuitive in that the cost of “home bias” is 
reflected here in the cost of debt.  Controlling for issue characteristics, firms attempting to 
finance in the foreign bond market will be charged a higher rate if they choose the destination 
market with a more different economy.    
Column (5) in Table 6 replace the Economic Distance with the Financial Distance measure.  
The results also suggest that magnitude of coefficient is much smaller than the economic 
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distance (0.917 vs 0.117).  Besides, LOF is more sensitive to the Economic difference between 
the two countries.  These results demonstrate that Economic Distance impacts foreign bond 
investor returns more than Financial Distance, ceteris paribus.   
In columns (6), (7) and (8), we examine the effects of legal, political, and demographic 
distance, respectively.  Column (6) results are consistent with prior research of La Porta et al. 
(1997).  Coefficient of Common Law is significantly positive, suggesting that the firm from a 
common law country moving “down” to a civil-law foreign market (weaker investor protections 
and lower quality of law enforcement), tend to have a higher cost of debt compared to those who 
move laterally to a similar common law foreign market.  This is because countries with poorer 
investor protections have smaller and narrow capital markets thus representing higher risk and 
corresponding higher cost of financing.  On the contrary, coefficients of Civil Laws are 
significantly negative, suggesting that the firm from a civil law country moving “up” to a foreign 
market of common law system (stronger investor protections and higher quality of law 
enforcement), is more likely to receive a reduction in the cost of debt compared with those who 
move “laterally” to a similar civil law foreign market.  In particular, we find firms from French 
law system receive the highest discount when they choose to issue foreign debt in a common law 
country rather than a French civil law country.   
Columns (9) and (10) provide results using all distance measures in the regression instead of 
including them individually.  Column (9) report coefficient estimates which include all distance 
measures with the whole sample.  To remove any potential bias that could arise from a large 
number of foreign bond issues by US firms, we re-ran the regressions with only non-US issued 
foreign bonds. Column (10) reports coefficient estimates which include all distance measures 
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with only the non-US issued foreign bonds.  Results on columns (9) and (10) again show 
increase in institutional distance leads to increased cost of debt.   
Given that yield spread is only one possible manifestation of LOF, we extended our analysis 
by examining the impact of LOF on issuing cost.  Compared with a bond’s borrowing cost which 
is measured as yield spread (an indicator of the credit risk of that bond relative to the risk free 
benchmark), issuing cost is priced by underwriters either based on some issue characteristics 
directly by adjusting the fee or other characteristics indirectly by setting the guaranteed price 
(Melnik and Nissim, 2003).  More importantly, we explore if a “frequent” foreign bond issuer 
could have some comparative advantage in the issuance process, i.e., frequency of foreign bond 
issuance could possibly help to mitigate the underwriting costs.   
In Table 7 we present the regression results of underwriting cost (sum of management fee, 
underwriting fee and selling concession) against the distance variables, frequency dummy 
variable and issue characteristics control variables.  Since only publicly listed firms provide 
issuing cost data, our sample size is reduced almost by half here.   The coefficients we are most 
interested are the coefficients for distance variables and the coefficient for frequency dummy 
variable.  The results of Table 7 are similar to the results in Table 6 in that underwriting costs of 
foreign bond issuance increases with larger maturity risk, larger issue size, higher historical rate, 
higher callable risk, and lower credit rating.  Further, underwriting cost is very sensitive to the 
frequency of foreign bond issuance, and the frequency dummy variable is significant in all four 
columns of Table 7. Knowledge distance and financial distance have significant impact on the 
underwriting costs.  Columns (1) shows one percentage increase (decrease) in knowledge 
distance would lead to 2.849 percentage of increase (decrease) in the yield spread; likewise, one 
percentage increase (decrease) in financial distance would lead to 5.712 percentage of increase 
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(decrease) in the yield spread, respectively. Interestingly,  coefficients on some distance 
measures (cultural, economic, legal, political, and demographic) are no longer significant, 
indicating that frequency helps to mitigate the issuing cost since frequent issuers tend to have 
lower monitoring, certification, and marketing costs per dollar of new capital than do new issuers 
in the foreign capital market.   
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Overall, results in Tables 7 show that the coefficients associated with frequent foreign bond 
issuers are significantly negative in all columns of the table.4   Our results validate Yasuda 
(2005) that there is a significant underwriting fee discount when there are certain “relationships” 
between firms and banks, i.e., “the more familiar is cheaper”.   One possible explanation is that 
for frequent issuers the underwriter’s marginal information costs are lower and they are passing 
on the part of these cost savings to the issuing firms. 
Table 7 also confirms Melnik and Nissim (2003) that total underwriter compensation 
increases with the bonds’ credit risk and maturity, but it is insignificantly related to issue size.  
Moreover, by controlling for issue size, we rule out the possibility that economies of scale is the 
source of cost reduction (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000).  Instead we find that it is attributable to 
the issuer’s previous foreign issuance history.  Therefore the results in Tables 7 clearly suggest 
that the LOF could be significantly lessened because of the company’s previous experience in 
foreign bond issuance.  Table 7 columns (3) and (4) report results of non-US issued foreign 
bonds only.  Results on four columns are highly consistent. 
                                                 
4 The results are consistent regardless whether the issuing cost is measured by management fee, underwriting fee, or 
selling concessions. 
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4.2 Robustness tests 
We conducted three different robustness tests to assess the validity of our results.  We had 
originally estimated our models using Euclidean distance measures.  Euclidean distance, defined 
as the geometrically shortest possible distance between two points, is a popular measure of 
distance in social science studies (Berry et al., 2010).  The Euclidean distance measure meets all 
five of the desirable properties including symmetry, non-negativity, identification, definiteness, 
and triangle inequality.  In the robustness test, we followed Berry et al. (2010) and used 
Mahalanobis distance measures instead of Euclidean distance.  This helps to overcome the 
methodological limitations of the Euclidean approach, which is scale invariant and takes into 
consideration the variance–covariance matrix.  The Mahalanobis method ensures that variables 
are orthogonal to each other.  We followed Berry et al.'s (2010) approach to operationalize these 
variables and they were computed the same way other distance measures were computed (see 
Table 1 for further details). Our results in Tables 8 and Table 9 show that Cultural Distance, 
Knowledge Distance, Financial Distance, Legal Distance, Demographic Distance, and 
Geographic Distance) are each significantly positively related with the cost of foreign debt 
financing.5  Furthermore, for both tables we run the non-US issues subsample regression in the 
last column of the table and the results are highly consistent with those on the whole samples.   
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
                                                 
5  Heather Berry provides data for the nine institutional distance dimensions of the 2010 JIBS paper on the Wharton 
LAUDER website: http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/resources-publications/. However, as stated in general 
instructions, “… distance dimensions are only as good as the underlying raw data that were used to create them.  
Where there is missing data across countries and time in the source data, we also suffer from the same missing data 
points.  In addition, there is one distance dimension where we interpolated between two data points to create yearly 
data – our cultural distance dimension.” 
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Second, we repeated the analysis with Eurobonds as our sample to examine if the LOF exists 
for firms issuing Eurobonds.   In order to make the Eurobonds result comparable to the foreign 
bonds, we also cleaned the Eurobond data with the same procedures such as removing issuances 
from tax haven countries, only including non-financial issuance or non-government issuance, 
non-callable bond, etc.   The results show that, unlike foreign bonds, Eurobonds do not 
experience any significant LOF.  This could be explained by the following two reasons.  First, 
Eurobond distance between home and destination market is difficult to define and measure since 
the listing location is only for legal purposes and is not the real destination market.  Second, 
Eurobonds are not subject to any national regulation while foreign bonds are issued in 
destination country’s currency and are subject to destination market’s rules and regulations.  
Therefore, foreign bonds incur more costs than Eurobonds, and that could partially explains why 
LOF effects are significant only for foreign bonds.  The result also explains why the foreign 
bonds are waning and Eurobonds are gaining increasing popularity in recent years.  Eurobonds 
takes more than 70% of cross-border bond issuance in the last decade.  
Finally, to address potential problems with sample bias, we clustered standard errors by time 
and country as suggested by Petersen (2009).  The results for the clustering analyses confirm our 
conjectures as we expected.  Taken together, the results of all three robustness tests provide 
greater confidence in our results. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
                                                    -------------------------------------- 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Today firms have access to debt markets outside of their country of origin and bond issues in 
foreign markets are becoming increasingly common.  LOF is inherently a relative construct in 
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that its degree can only be assessed relative to host country competitors.  However, identifying 
and measuring LOF presents challenges that are specific to capital markets.  There is a growing 
body of evidence regarding the prevalence of LOF in all types of capital markets, namely equity, 
debt, and venture capital.  Yet, understanding what forms these liabilities can take and 
identifying their sources are vital to develop strategies for overcoming them.  Unlike product 
markets, there is no equivalent of profitability in capital markets, whether debt or equity markets.  
However, these liabilities may manifest in the form of higher costs of raising capital, lower 
liquidity of its securities, and tighter regulation of foreign firm’s securities compared to their 
local counterparts. 
We believe that the foreign bond market context offers a rich setting for international 
business and finance scholars to understand capital raising activities of firms, factors that impact 
market choice decisions, and how firms can overcome home country disadvantages.  From a 
theoretical perspective, we believe that our study of foreign debt markets can help prompt further 
investigations into the disadvantages firms face in host capital markets, and how firms 
successfully mitigate these disadvantages.  The decision to access foreign capital markets is 
likely to involve much more than simple comparisons of cost of debt in different markets.  Given 
the wide variation in disclosure standards and monitoring intensity across capital markets, a 
consideration of institutional differences is critical in understanding both firm decisions with 
regard to where to access debt markets and subsequent implications for a firm’s strategic 
choices.   
Most prior studies on institutional distance focus on a single dimension (or subset of 
dimensions).  This results in what at best is a partial understanding of the impact of institutional 
distance on the dependent variable of interest.  Further, although institutional distance is a 
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prominent construct in the international business literature, prior research has yet to explicitly 
examine the role of distance in the international capital market.  In this study, we attempt a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of distance by employing seven separate 
conceptualizations of distance including cultural, knowledge, economic, financial, legal, 
political, and demographic) to measure the cross-national differences. 
Our study shows that although firms are increasingly looking to source debt in foreign capital 
markets, greater institutional distance from the market does indeed lead to higher cost of debt.  
Thus, we provide increasing confirmation that the LOF phenomenon is equally prevalent in 
capital markets as well (Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012).  The results hold across multiple 
operationalizations of LOF.  Further, the results are consistent across different conceptualizations 
of institutional distance.  Second, our results also indicate that there are ways to mitigate LOF 
costs.  The familiarity that accrues from repeated debt offerings in the same market can indeed 
reduce LOF over time.  Building reputation and trust through the process of repeated issuances 
of debt or equity is one of the strategies that a firm can pursue to reduce its cost of capital when 
accessing capital resources outside its home market.   
Our study of the foreign bond market not only provides insights into the costs firms face 
when sourcing debt resources abroad, it also opens the door to future research into the strategies 
firms can employ to mitigate those costs and disadvantages.  Indeed, much of what is known 
about capital raising activities of firms has been confined to equity markets.  Foreign bonds can 
provide a rich context in which scholars can further understand capital raising activities of firms, 
factors that impact market choice decisions, and how firms can overcome home country 
disadvantages.    
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Table 1 Variables Definition for Foreign Bond Issuance Measures and Distance Measures 
 
 
Debt Issuance 
Measures 
Definition Data Source 
Yield to Maturity The annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. 
Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company 
(hereafter SDC) Platinum 
Treasury Yield 
The interest rate, measured in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's 
debt for different lengths of time. 
Federal Reserve Bank, SDC 
Yield Spread Difference between yield spread and treasury yield of the same maturity SDC 
Log (Maturity) Natural log of issue's maturity in months SDC 
CPN  Coupon rate in Percentage SDC 
Issue Size Bond issue's principal value (in thousands $) SDC 
S&P Rating S&P's numeric rating, the higher the number, the lower the rating SDC 
Frequency of 
Issuance  
If the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation. SDC 
Distance Measures Definition  Data Source  
Cultural Distance 
Differences in attitudes toward authority, trust, individuality, and importance of work and family, including (1) power 
distance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on obedience and respect for authority; (2) Uncertainty 
avoidance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on trusting people and job security; (3) Individualism, as 
measured by World Value Survey questions on independence and the role of government in providing for its citizens; 
and (4) Masculinity, as measured by World Value Survey questions on the importance of family and work. 
WorldValueSurvey (WVS) Database 
Knowledge  Distance 
Differences in patents and scientific production, including (1) number of patents, per 1 million population; and (2) 
number of scientific articles, per 1 million population.  
U.S. Patent Database - United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), Publications 
Database (WTI) 
Economic Distance 
Differences in economic development and macroeconomic characteristics, including: (1) GDP per capita; (2) inflation 
rate, GDP deflator in %; (3) imports of goods and services as % of GDP; and (4) exports of goods and services as % of 
GDP. 
World Development Indicators (hereafter WDI) 
Financial  Distance 
Differences in financial sector development, including: (1) domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP; (2) Market 
capitalization of listed companies as % of GDP; and (3) Number of listed companies, per 1 million population. 
WDI 
Political  Distance 
Differences in political stability, democracy, and trade bloc membership, size of the state, as measured by government 
consumption as % of GDP 
WDI 
Demographic 
Distance 
Differences in demographic characteristics, including: (1) Life expectancy, as measured by life expectancy at birth, total 
(years); (2) birth rate, per 1000 people; (3) Population of ages 0–14 as % of total population; and (4) Population ages 65 
and above as % of total population.  
WDI 
Connectedness  
Distance 
Differences in tourism and Internet use, including: (1) international tourism expenditure, as % of Imports; (2) 
international tourism receipts, as % of Exports; and (3) internet use Internet users per 100 people. 
WDI 
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Table 2   
Foreign Bonds by Issuer’s Home Country (1991-2014) 
This table presents all new public foreign bond issues by home countries and by Yankee vs non-Yankee bonds.  Data is obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Global New Issues database over 
the period January 1, 1991 through December 31, 2014.  We follow the sampling procedures of others (e.g.,Gozzi, Levine, & Schmukler, 2010) in order to isolate the foreign debt offerings of corporations 
rather than those of banks.  Moreover, our sample is restricted to only non-convertible foreign bonds.  In addition we have eliminated from consideration preferred stock, bonds-pipeline and registrations, 
medium-term note programs, private debt, as well as mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed securities.   Further, to remove the tax impacts on the destination market choice, our sample does 
not include those foreign bonds issued in tax-haven countries such as Belize, Barbados, Cayman, Cyprus, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Virgin Island, Bermuda, Bahamas, Costa Rica, etc. After applying 
these screening criteria, the final sample contains 772 new bond issues from 361 unique non-bank firms between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2014.   Letter ratings by the two agencies are transformed 
into a numeric scale and higher letter ratings correspond to lower numbers.  The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in Table 1 and Appendices A respectively.  
 
 
Home Country 
1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2014 
Yankee Other Total Yankee Other Total Yankee Other Total Yankee Other Total Yankee Other Total 
Africa 0 0 0 6 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asia 16 8 24 26 10 36 1 3 4 0 1 1 0 5 5 
Australia 1 4 5 9 7 16 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 5 1 
Canada 90 0 90 122 1 123 48 0 48 5 0 5 8 5 13 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
France 3 3 6 1 12 13 0 1 1 3 10 13 1 5 3 
Germany 0 0 0 5 5 10 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 5 1 
Japan 0 1 1 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latin America & Caribbean 3 0 3 34 0 34 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 3 0 3 15 0 15 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 2 
Middle East 0 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 12 1 13 14 1 15 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 
Other 6 0 6 10 0 10 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 8 0 8 62 0 62 3 0 3 0 2 2 4 5 9 
United States 0 6 6 0 20 20 0 7 7 0 17 17 0 5 14 
Western Europe 7 0 7 39 2 41 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 5 1 
Total 154 23 176 358 59 417 67 15 82 12 38 50 14 5 47 
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Table 3 (Panel A and Panel B) 
Summary Statistics of Bond Issue Characteristics  
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the newly issued foreign bond-specific characteristics, market variables, and other control variables by issuer’s home country in Panel A and by foreign bond host 
country in Panel B.  Maturity in Month is the foreign bond issue's maturity in months; issue size is the bond issue's principal value in millions $; coupon in % is the coupon rate in percentage; S&P is the 
numeric credit rating converted from letter rating with the higher the number, the lower the rating; Similarly, Moody is the is the numeric Moody’s credit rating converted from letter rating with the higher 
the number, the lower the rating Yield to Maturity in % is the annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in percentage. Treasury yield is the interest rate, 
measured in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. Yield spread is the difference between yield spread and treasury yield 
of the same maturity, measured in Basis Point. 
 
Panel A                              
Home 
Country 
N 
Maturity  in 
Month 
Principal  in 
Million $ 
Coupon in %  S&P Moody 
Yield to 
Maturity in %                   
Treasury 
Yield in %               
Yield Spread                  
in Basis Point                    
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Africa 7 34.55 41.96 144.33 80.52 6.78 2.78 5.71 5.31 5.57 5.16 6.89 3.02 6.13 0.43 144.60 274.53 
Asia 70 109.89 68.91 228.66 124.63 6.26 3.23 7.97 3.41 8.49 3.07 7.75 11.66 4.53 2.68 182.23 156.19 
Australia 30 82.02 40.45 233.60 117.88 6.67 2.51 5.76 4.32 6.07 4.53 7.16 2.61 5.47 1.12 216.33 283.34 
Canada 274 153.03 97.19 221.43 203.36 8.31 1.93 10.05 3.65 10.50 3.73 8.53 1.93 5.95 1.27 260.71 190.21 
East Europe 
&CentralAsia                     
6 80.36 34.46 179.96 96.50 6.34 5.03 11.50 3.56 11.67 4.23 7.87 4.31 3.16 1.83 279.25 223.19 
France 36 93.99 93.13 424.08 471.96 4.77 2.73 4.22 3.12 4.19 2.94 4.75 2.67 2.76 2.60 123.62 118.37 
Germany 16 55.83 31.88 255.51 208.18 3.28 2.32 5.94 3.60 5.88 3.40 3.98 3.39 2.49 2.32 138.31 174.80 
Japan 4 120.40 42.48 58.94 59.58 8.79 2.59 7.25 6.29 5.50 6.40 8.72 2.51 5.58 0.27 243.33 227.50 
Latin Amer.             
& Caribbean 
39 123.47 72.96 202.62 119.47 9.01 2.50 10.51 3.37 11.46 3.39 9.36 2.05 5.96 0.57 333.91 214.69 
Mexico 23 86.57 27.03 241.41 212.97 9.13 2.95 11.90 2.64 12.24 2.74 9.13 2.97 5.31 1.93 341.47 181.78 
Middle East 7 127.02 52.69 267.86 203.98 7.43 3.82 9.86 4.91 9.57 4.39 9.24 2.43 5.79 0.18 395.80 274.84 
Netherlands 33 150.56 103.21 270.23 198.96 7.71 2.59 8.24 3.78 8.58 4.04 7.77 2.59 5.55 1.80 232.56 244.88 
New Zealand 8 178.97 124.71 214.01 77.59 6.75 2.29 6.63 2.56 7.13 2.03 6.80 2.30 5.76 2.41 104.00 29.25 
Spain 3 142.36 89.62 90.00 138.56 5.96 1.19 4.67 0.58 4.33 0.58 5.96 1.19 4.48 0.40 89.50 48.79 
United 
Kingdom 
84 127.37 79.59 417.90 449.42 7.26 3.00 9.26 3.79 9.63 3.81 7.90 2.73 5.31 1.54 237.49 210.85 
United States 64 53.43 20.85 342.27 234.98 3.54 1.80 4.69 1.53 4.58 1.42 3.55 1.81 1.97 1.51 68.44 51.24 
Western 
Europe 
48 149.15 96.06 242.57 259.88 8.08 2.60 10.27 3.96 10.55 3.93 8.43 2.39 5.79 0.75 272.17 204.56 
Other 20 118.87 88.93 260.23 282.20 9.26 2.43 10.70 2.18 11.20 2.21 9.34 2.48 6.27 1.99 307.45 219.72 
Panel B                             
Host 
Country 
N 
Maturity  in 
Month 
Principal  in 
Million $ 
Coupon in %  S&P Moody 
Yield to 
Maturity in %                   
Treasury 
Yield in %                           
Yield Spread                  
in Basis Point                    
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Australia 11 71.58 19.73 287.23 147.81 5.17 0.96 4.20 1.99 4.55 1.75 5.24 0.97 4.22 1.21 113.20 36.96 
Canada 28 74.41 57.02 331.30 198.26 3.81 0.99 4.85 1.97 5.19 2.21 3.82 0.99 2.62 1.24 106.60 49.51 
China 1 240.85 n/a 118.57 n/a 4.65 n/a 12.00 n/a 12.00 n/a 4.65 n/a 3.62 n/a 103.00 n/a 
Japan 117 52.53 24.50 283.34 204.50 3.23 1.86 5.37 2.34 5.40 2.30 3.23 1.86 0.85 0.46 83.70 93.66 
New Zealand 4 114.60 6.65 170.59 87.86 7.62 0.99 2.00 1.73 1.00 0.00 7.27 1.28 6.92 0.47 25.67 5.13 
Spain 7 95.19 91.09 80.00 7.62 8.72 2.12 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 8.45 2.00 6.78 n/a 13.00 n/a 
United States 604 140.93 90.12 263.83 282.14 8.23 2.37 9.75 3.82 10.16 3.88 8.77 4.38 5.87 1.25 263.81 204.73 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics of Institutional Distances 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of distance measures. Cultural distance is differences in attitudes toward authority, trust, individuality, and 
importance of work and family, including (1) power distance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on obedience and respect for authority; 
(2) Uncertainty avoidance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on trusting people and job security; (3) Individualism, as measured by 
World Value Survey questions on independence and the role of government in providing for its citizens; and (4) Masculinity, as measured by World 
Value Survey questions on the importance of family and work. Knowledge distance is differences in patents and scientific production, including 
(1) number of patents, per 1 million population; and (2) number of scientific articles, per 1 million population. Economic Distance is differences in 
economic development and macroeconomic characteristics, including: (1) GDP per capita; (2) inflation rate, GDP deflator in %; (3) imports of 
goods and services as % of GDP; and (4) exports of goods and services as % of GDP. Financial Distance is differences in financial sector 
development, including: (1) domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP; (2) Market capitalization of listed companies as % of GDP; and (3) 
Number of listed companies, per 1 million population. Political Distance is differences in political stability, democracy, and trade bloc membership, 
size of the state, as measured by government consumption as % of GDP.  Demographic Distance is differences in demographic characteristics, 
including: (1) Life expectancy, as measured by life expectancy at birth, total (years); (2) birth rate, per 1000 people; (3) Population of ages 0–14 as 
% of total population; and (4) Population ages 65 and above as % of total population. 
 
 
 
 
Distance Mean Minimum 25th 
Pctl 
50th 
Pctl 
75th 
Pctl 
Maximum Std 
Dev 
Cultural Distance 1.334 0.123 0.123 0.319 1.883 6.208 1.758 
Knowledge Distance 1.529 0.040 1.445 1.693 1.821 1.996 0.500 
Economic Distance 0.150 0.003 0.085 0.097 0.130 1.012 0.132 
Financial Distance 0.585 0.039 0.445 0.500 0.575 9.652 0.746 
Political Distance 5.076 0.019 3.546 4.888 6.593 13.860 2.476 
Demographic 
Distance 
0.044 0.000 0.014 0.022 0.038 0.970 0.108 
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Table 5 Correlation of Institutional Distance 
 
Table 5 provides correlations of distance measures.  Cultural distance is differences in attitudes toward authority, trust, individuality, and importance 
of work and family, including (1) power distance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on obedience and respect for authority; (2) 
Uncertainty avoidance, as measured by World Value Survey questions on trusting people and job security; (3) Individualism, as measured by World 
Value Survey questions on independence and the role of government in providing for its citizens; and (4) Masculinity, as measured by World Value 
Survey questions on the importance of family and work. Knowledge distance is differences in patents and scientific production, including (1) 
number of patents, per 1 million population; and (2) number of scientific articles, per 1 million population. Economic Distance is differences in 
economic development and macroeconomic characteristics, including: (1) GDP per capita; (2) inflation rate, GDP deflator in %; (3) imports of 
goods and services as % of GDP; and (4) exports of goods and services as % of GDP. Financial Distance is differences in financial sector 
development, including: (1) domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP; (2) Market capitalization of listed companies as % of GDP; and (3) 
Number of listed companies, per 1 million population. Political Distance is differences in political stability, democracy, and trade bloc membership, 
size of the state, as measured by government consumption as % of GDP.  Demographic Distance is differences in demographic characteristics, 
including: (1) Life expectancy, as measured by life expectancy at birth, total (years); (2) birth rate, per 1000 people; (3) Population of ages 0–14 
as % of total population; and (4) Population ages 65 and above as % of total population. 
 
 
 
 
  Cultural            
Distance  
Knowledge 
Distance  
Economic 
Distance   
Financial      
Distance  
Political                
Distance  
Demographic 
Distance  
Cultural                            
Distance  
1.000 
     
     
Knowledge                  
Distance  
-0.024 
1.000 
    
0.528 
    
Economic                 
Distance   
0.727 0.292 
1.000 
   
<.0001 <.0001 
   
Financial                     
Distance  
0.119 -0.206 0.021 
1.000 
  
0.002 <.0001 0.585 
  
Political                      
Distance  
-0.253 0.156 -0.233 -0.150 
1.000 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Demographic 
Distance  
0.325 0.036 0.262 -0.014 -0.128 
1.000 
<.0001 0.352 <.0001 0.717 0.001 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 6 Yield Spread Regression on Distance  
Table 6 presents the regression results of yield spread against distance measures of foreign bonds with controls for bond issue-specific variables. Dependent variable is yield spread.  Columns (1) reports 
the baseline model without adding the distance measures.  Models (2) – (8) reports coefficient estimates from individual distance measures. Model (9) report coefficient estimates which include all distance 
measures with the whole sample.  To remove the “US effect”, column (10) report coefficient estimates which include all distance measures with only the non-US issued foreign bonds. log (Maturity) is 
the natural log of issue's maturity in months; Issue Size is bond issue's principal value (in thousands $); Coupon Rate is Coupon rate in Percentage; S&P Rating is the S&P's numeric rating, the higher the 
number, the lower the rating; Yield to Maturity is annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. Treasury Yield is the interest rate, measured in 
percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. Yield Spread is difference between yield spread and treasury yield of the same 
maturity. Frequency of Issuance is dummy variable with assigned value of 1 if the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation and 0 otherwise. All distance measures, 
including Cultural Distance, Knowledge Distance, Economic Distance, Financial Distance, Legal Distance, Political Distance, and Demographic Distance are same as defined in Tables 3 & 4.  Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in Table 1 and 
Appendix 1 respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Yield Spread in Percentage 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   
Intercept -0.930 * -0.988 * -1.755 *** -2.167 *** -1.319 *** -0.916 * -1.261 *** -1.973 *** -1.515   -1.443   
  (0.547)   (0.597)   (0.586)   (0.491)   (0.484)   (0.540)   (0.485)   (0.473)   (1.128)   (1.147)   
log (Maturity) 0.094   0.071   0.058   0.130 * 0.093   0.069   0.057   0.096   0.114   0.151 * 
  (0.077)   (0.080)   (0.081)   (0.078)   (0.080)   (0.078)   (0.081)   (0.078)   (0.084)   (0.085)   
Issue Size 0.028   0.079   0.014   0.034   0.054   -0.06   0.069   0.031   -0.034   0.008   
  (0.167)   (0.174)   (0.185)   (0.167)   (0.176)   (0.171)   (0.182)   (0.172)   (0.185)   (0.190)   
Coupon Rate 0.228 *** 0.205 *** 0.189 *** 0.220 *** 0.215 *** 0.202 *** 0.212 *** 0.226 *** 0.168 *** 0.163 *** 
  (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.025)   (0.026)   
Treasury Yield -0.169 *** -0.126 *** -0.193 *** -0.184 *** -0.183 *** -0.128 *** -0.141 *** -0.169 *** -0.194 *** -0.272 *** 
  (0.043)   (0.046)   (0.049)   (0.044)   (0.046)   (0.045)   (0.048)   (0.043)   (0.056)   (0.066)   
Frequency of Issue -0.248 ** -0.169 * -0.207 ** -0.211 ** -0.23 ** -0.207 ** -0.235 ** -0.244 ** -0.161   -0.109   
  (0.099)   (0.102)   (0.103)   (0.101)   (0.103)   (0.099)   (0.104)   (0.100)   (0.107)   (0.109)   
S&P Rating 0.367 *** 0.376 *** 0.379 *** 0.381 *** 0.386 *** 0.3818 *** 0.382 *** 0.368 *** 0.405 *** 0.411 *** 
  (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
Cultural Distance      0.061 **                         0.073   0.031   
      (0.026)                           (0.058)   (0.059)   
Knowledge Distance          0.581 ***                     0.051   0.015   
          (0.148)                       (0.220)   (0.263)   
Economic Distance               0.917 ***                 1.655 ** 2.189 *** 
              (0.346)                   (0.751)   (0.769)   
Financial Distance                  0.117               0.062   0.089   
                  (0.081)               (0.087)   (0.108)   
Common Law                     0.8914 ***         0.816 *** 1.268 *** 
                      (0.163)           (0.246)   (0.284)   
Scandinavian Civil                     -0.949 ***         -1.067 ** -1.527 *** 
                      (0.330)           (0.542)   (0.559)   
French Civil                     -0.726 **         -0.896 *** -1.284 *** 
                      (0.162)           (0.246)   (0.277)   
German Civil                     -0.441 **         -0.744 *** -0.519 ** 
                      (0.183)           (0.255)   (0.281)   
Political Distance                          0.027       0.084 *** 0.084 *** 
                          (0.022)       (0.030)   (0.031)   
Demographic Distance                              0.092   -5.513 ** -6.093 ** 
                              (0.361)   (2.614)   (2.643)   
Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 582   551   525   548   526   563   520   572   488   468   
Adj. R2 0.782   0.783   0.787   0.794   0.792   0.792   0.789   0.780   0.808   0.760   
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Table 7 Underwriting Costs Regression on Distance 
 
Table 7 presents the regression results of underwriting cost against distance measures with controls for bond issue-specific variables. Total 
underwriting fee is composed of selling concession fee, management fee, and underwriting fee. Among these, selling concession is a major 
component of total underwriting fee.  Columns (1) and (2) report the selling concession and total underwriting fee regressions on distance variables 
with the whole sample; columns (3) and (4) report the selling concession and total underwriting fee regressions on distance variables with the non-
US issued foreign bond samples only. Log (Maturity) is the natural log of issue's maturity in months; Issue Size is bond issue's principal value (in 
thousands $); Coupon Rate is Coupon rate in Percentage; S&P Rating is the S&P's numeric rating, the higher the number, the lower the rating; 
Yield to Maturity is annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. Treasury Yield is the 
interest rate, measured in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. 
Yield Spread is difference between yield spread and treasury yield of the same maturity. Frequency of Issuance is dummy variable with assigned 
value of 1 if the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation and 0 otherwise. All distance measures, including 
Cultural Distance, Knowledge Distance, Economic Distance, Financial Distance, Legal Distance, Political Distance, and Demographic Distance 
are same as defined in Tables 3 & 4.   Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in Table 1 and Appendix 1 respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Total Underwriting Fee 
  Whole Sample Non-US Issuance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -6.349   -7.966   -6.487   -15.182 ** 
  (4.416)   (5.086)   (4.536)   (6.229)   
log (Maturity) 0.998 * 1.403 *** 1.008 ** 1.487 *** 
  (0.481)   (0.517)   (0.499)   (0.530)   
Issue Size 0.112   0.135   -0.059   0.167   
  (1.118)   (1.156)   (1.201)   (1.215)   
Coupon Rate 0.520 *** 0.417 * 0.512 *** 0.374   
  (0.191)   (0.223)   (0.197)   (0.231)   
Treasury Yield 0.532   -0.470   0.666   -0.230   
  (0.333)   (0.477)   (0.361)   (0.509)   
Frequency of Issue -1.150 ** -1.130  * -1.213 ** -1.303 ** 
  (0.590)   (0.650)   (0.614)   (0.672)   
S&P Rating 0.295 *** 0.327 *** 0.316 *** 0.417 *** 
  (0.107)   (0.122)   (0.111)   (0.128)   
Cultural Distance      0.122       0.173   
      (0.323)       (0.334)   
Knowledge Distance      2.849 **     1.899 * 
      (1.428)       (1.535)   
Economic Distance       -4.074       -5.782   
      (4.505)       (4.664)   
Financial Distance      5.712 *     17.302 ** 
      (3.165)       (6.807)   
Common Law     -1.525       -4.380   
      (1.429)       (1.990)   
Scandinavian Civil     1.024       3.052   
      (2.665)       (3.060)   
French Civil     1.105       3.299   
      (1.322)       (1.974)   
German Civil     -3.594 **     -4.717   
      (1.563)       (1.850)   
Political Distance      -0.033       -0.075   
      (0.162)       (0.165)   
Demographic Distance      -1.898       -2.223   
      (13.632)       (13.941)   
Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 325   284   306   269   
Adj. R2 0.416   0.429   0.355   0.382   
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Table 8 Robustness Test: Yield Spread Regression using Mahalanobis (Berry et al. 2010) Measurements 
Table 8 presents the robustness regression results of yield spread against Mahalanobis distance measures with controls for bond issue-specific variables. Dependent variable is yield spread.  We followed 
Berry et al. (2010) and used Mahalanobis distance measures instead of Euclidean distance.  This helps to overcome the methodological limitations of the Euclidean approach which is scale invariant and 
takes into consideration the variance–covariance matrix. Columns (1) – (8) reports coefficient estimates from individual distance measures. Column (9) reports coefficient estimates which include all 
distance measures with the whole sample.  To remove the “US effect”, column (10) reports coefficient estimates which include all distance measures with only the non-US issued foreign bonds.  Log 
(Maturity) is the natural log of issue's maturity in months; Issue Size is bond issue's principal value (in thousands $); Coupon Rate is Coupon rate in Percentage; S&P Rating is the S&P's numeric rating, 
the higher the number, the lower the rating; Yield to Maturity is annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. Treasury Yield is the interest rate, 
measured in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. Yield Spread is difference between yield spread and treasury yield of 
the same maturity. Frequency of Issuance is dummy variable with assigned value of 1 if the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation and 0 otherwise. All distance 
measures, including Cultural Distance, Knowledge Distance, Economic Distance, Financial Distance, Legal Distance, Political Distance, and Demographic Distance are same as defined in Tables 3 & 4.    
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in 
Table 1 and Appendix 1 respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Yield Spread in Percentage 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   
Intercept -2.594 * -1.770 *** -1.228 *** -1.380 * -0.916 * -0.886 *** -1.375 *** -1.655   -0.996   -1.072   
  (0.698)   (0.606)   (0.489)   (0.799)   (0.540)   (0.658)   (0.499)   (0.506)   (1.284)   (1.298)   
log (Maturity) 0.091   0.053   0.066   0.058   0.069   0.044   0.082   0.078   0.099   0.119   
  (0.083)   (0.082)   (0.082)   (0.084)   (0.078)   (0.081)   (0.082)   (0.081)   (0.086)   (0.088)   
Issue Size -0.017   0.059   0.054   0.118   -0.060   0.056   0.071   0.046   -0.040   -0.013   
  (0.189)   (0.187)   (0.184)   (0.188)   (0.171)   (0.183)   (0.184)   (0.182)   (0.195)   (0.201)   
Coupon Rate 0.222 *** 0.203 *** 0.211 *** 0.204 *** 0.202 *** 0.210 *** 0.213 *** 0.213 *** 0.196 *** 0.190 *** 
  (0.025)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.024)   (0.026)   (0.026)   
Treasury Yield -0.133 *** -0.156 *** -0.141 *** -0.113 ** -0.128 *** -0.129 *** -0.114 ** -0.139 *** -0.201 *** -0.240 *** 
  (0.048)   (0.049)   (0.046)   (0.048)   (0.045)   (0.046)   (0.048)   (0.046)   (0.056)   (0.059)   
Frequency of Issue -0.148   -0.185 * -0.197 ** -0.211 ** -0.207 ** -0.202 ** -0.210 ** -0.151   -0.068   -0.066   
  (0.109)   (0.107)   (0.104)   (0.106)   (0.099)   (0.104)   (0.103)   (0.104)   (0.112)   (0.113)   
S&P Rating 0.376 *** 0.378 *** 0.375 *** 0.373 *** 0.382 *** 0.374 *** 0.376 *** 0.384 *** 0.386 *** 0.392 *** 
  (0.016)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.017)   
Cultural Distance  0.019 ***                             -0.006   -0.003   
  (0.006)                               (0.010)   (0.010)   
Knowledge Distance      0.013 *                         0.040 *** 0.031 ** 
      (0.008)                           (0.013)   (0.014)   
Economic Distance           0.009                       0.018   0.016   
          (0.007)                       (0.012)   (0.012)   
Financial Distance              0.023 *                 0.002   -0.006   
              -0.014                   (0.020)   (0.021)   
Common Law                 0.891 ***             1.346 *** 1.499 *** 
                  (0.163)               (0.263)   (0.276)   
Scandinavian Civil                 -0.949 ***             -1.385 *** -1.537 *** 
                  (0.330)               (0.378)   (0.390)   
French Civil                 -0.726 ***             -1.284 *** -1.396 *** 
                  (0.162)               (0.255)   (0.265)   
German Civil                 -0.441 **             -0.483 ** -0.509 ** 
                  (0.183)               (0.024)   (0.254)   
Political Distance                      0.000           0.000   0.000   
                      (0.000)           (0.000)   (0.000)   
Demographic Distance                          0.023 **     -0.010   -0.009   
                          (0.012)       (0.019)   (0.020)   
Geographic Distance                             0.000 *** 0.000   0.000   
                              0.000   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 509   525   546   525   564   544   545   546   398   385   
Adj. R2 0.781   0.781   0.778   0.779   0.792   0.780   0.778   0.782   0.795   0.792   
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Table 9 Robustness Test:  
Underwriting Costs Regression using Mahalanobis (Berry et al. 2010) Measurements 
 
Table 9 presents the regression results of transaction cost against Mahalanobis distance measures with controls for bond issue-specific variables. 
Total underwriting fee is composed of selling concession fee, management fee, and underwriting fee. Among these, selling concession is a major 
component of total underwriting fee.  We followed Berry et al. (2010) and used Mahalanobis distance measures instead of Euclidean distance.  This 
helps to overcome the methodological limitations of the Euclidean approach which is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance–
covariance matrix.  Columns (1) and (2) report the selling concession and total underwriting fee regressions on distance variables with the whole 
sample; columns (3) and (4) report the selling concession and total underwriting fee regressions on distance variables with the non-US issued 
foreign bond samples only.  Log (Maturity) is the natural log of issue's maturity in months; Issue Size is bond issue's principal value (in thousands 
$); Coupon Rate is Coupon rate in Percentage; S&P Rating is the S&P's numeric rating, the higher the number, the lower the rating; Yield to 
Maturity is annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. Treasury Yield is the interest 
rate, measured in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. Yield 
Spread is difference between yield spread and treasury yield of the same maturity. Frequency of Issuance is dummy variable with assigned value 
of 1 if the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation and 0 otherwise. All distance measures, including Cultural 
Distance, Knowledge Distance, Economic Distance, Financial Distance, Political Distance, Demographic Distance, and legal system variables are 
same as defined in Tables 3 & 4.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in Table 1 and Appendix 1 respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Total Underwriting Fee 
  
(1)                       
Whole Sample 
(2)                       
Non-US Issued 
Foreign Bonds 
Intercept -5.338   -5.280   
  (7.159)   (7.650)   
log (Maturity) 1.217 ** 1.140 * 
  (0.606)   (0.638)   
Issue Size -0.623   -1.137   
  (1.263)   (1.374)   
Coupon Rate 0.183   0.220   
  (0.212)   (0.220)   
Treasury Yield 0.347   0.534   
  (0.473)   (0.519)   
Frequency of Issue -2.285 *** -2.274 *** 
  (0.738)   (0.763)   
S&P Rating 0.016   0.002   
  (0.128)   (0.132)   
Culture Distance  0.061   0.068   
  (0.061)   (0.067)   
Knowledge Distance  -0.037   -0.003   
  (0.097)   (0.115)   
Economic Distance   0.532 *** 0.567 *** 
  (0.166)   (0.179)   
Financial Distance  -0.155   -0.113   
  (0.144)   (0.151)   
Common Law -1.051   -2.247   
      (1.948)   
Scandinavian Civil 1.230   2.120   
  (2.176)   (2.303)   
French Civil -0.669   -0.024   
  (1.580)   (1.680)   
German Civil -0.378   -0.573   
  (1.231)   (1.560)   
Political Distance  0.001   0.001   
  (0.001)   (0.001)   
Demographic Distance  -0.129   -0.088   
  (0.136)   (0.173)   
Geographic Distance  0.000   0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   
Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   
N 212   199   
Adj. R2 0.457   0.407   
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Table 10 Robustness Test: Yield Spread Regression on Eurobond Samples 
 
Table 11 presents the regression results of yield spread against distance measures of Eurobonds with controls for bond issue-specific variables. Dependent variable is yield spread.  Columns (1) reports 
the baseline model without adding the distance measures.  Columns (2) – (6) reports coefficient estimates from individual distance measures. Column (7) report coefficient estimates which include all 
distance measures with the whole sample.  To remove the “US effect”, column (8) report coefficient estimates which include all distance measures with only the non-US issued foreign bonds. log (Maturity) 
is the natural log of issue's maturity in months; Issue Size is bond issue's principal value (in thousands $); Coupon Rate is Coupon rate in Percentage; S&P Rating is the S&P's numeric rating, the higher 
the number, the lower the rating; Yield to Maturity is annualized rate of return anticipated on a bond if held until end of its maturity, measured in Percentage. Treasury Yield is the interest rate, measured 
in percentage, which the government pays to borrow money by issuing the government's debt for different lengths of time. Yield Spread is difference between yield spread and treasury yield of the same 
maturity. Frequency of Issuance is dummy variable with assigned value of 1 if the bond issuer frequently issue foreign bond in the foreign bond market nation and 0 otherwise. All distance measures, 
including Cultural Distance, Knowledge Distance, Economic Distance, Financial Distance, Political Distance, Demographic Distance, and legal system variables are same as defined in Tables 3 & 4.  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The definitions of each variable and numeric ratings are described in 
Table 1 and Appendix 1 respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Yield Spread in Percentage 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(6) (7) 
  Whole Sample 
Non-U.S. 
Issuance 
Intercept -1.130 *** -1.912 *** -1.291 *** -1.237 *** -0.956 *** -0.948 *** -1.112 *** 
  (0.092)   (0.288)   (0.138)   (0.139)   (0.123)   (0.321)   (0.363)   
log (Maturity) 0.061 *** 0.183 *** 0.041   0.041   0.062 *** 0.060   0.052   
  (0.017)   (0.045)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.023)   (0.053)   (0.061)   
Issue Size 0.044 *** -0.045   0.055 ** 0.052 * 0.055 ** -0.109 ** -0.122 * 
  (0.016)   (0.053)   (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.023)   (0.057)   (0.068)   
Coupon Rate 0.613 *** 0.616 *** 0.686 *** 0.685 *** 0.795 *** 0.745 *** 0.727 *** 
  (0.009)   (0.020)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.028)   (0.032)   
Treasury Yield -0.455 *** -0.371 *** -0.414 *** -0.412 *** -0.658 *** -0.548 *** -0.517 *** 
  (0.011)   (0.021)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.015)   (0.032)       
Frequency of Issue -0.084 *** 0.023   -0.090 ** -0.095 ** -0.084 ** 0.055 *** 0.097   
  (0.032)   (0.067)   (0.044)   (0.044)   (0.040)   (0.080)   (0.091)   
S&P Rating 0.155 *** 0.181 *** 0.150 *** 0.150 *** 0.100 *** 0.123   0.134 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.010)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.013)   (0.014)   
Cultural Distance      0.001               0.001   0.002   
      (0.002)               (0.003)   (0.003)   
Knowledge Distance          0.001           -0.004   0.004   
          (0.002)           (0.004)   (0.006)   
Economic Distance               -0.002 *     -0.004   -0.003   
              (0.001)       (0.002)   (0.003)   
Financial Distance                  0.003   0.001   -0.003   
                  (0.002)   (0.007)   (0.009)   
Connected Distance                      0.007   0.019    
                      (0.028)   (0.032)   
Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Dummy Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 4218   950   2381   2374   2111   553   470   
Adj. R2 0.834   0.872   0.860   0.859   0.890   0.832   0.824   
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      Appendix 1 
S&P and Moody’s Numerical vs. Letter Ratings 
 
Numerical Rating S&P Rating Moody’s Rating 
1 AAA Aaa 
2 AA+ Aa1 
3 AA Aa2 
4 AA- Aa3 
5 A+ A1 
6 A A2 
7 A- A3 
8 BBB+ Baa1 
9 BBB Baa2 
10 BBB- Baa3 
11 BB+ Ba1 
12 BB Ba2 
13 BB- Ba3 
14 B+ B1 
15 B B2 
16 B- B3 
17 CCC+ Caa1 
18 CCC Caa2 
19 CCC- Caa3 
20 CC Ca 
21 C C 
 
